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: he intentional or reckless characterization of Mr. Lambson as a "concerned 
citizen rather than an individual detained by officers for possession of a stolen ring, 
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criminal history which includes a charge of a crime of dishonesty along with the 
complete absence of any corroboration negates a finding of probable cause. Attempts to 
validate the affidavit on the basis that a separate affidavit containing the correct 
circumstances of the informant was "simultaneously" presented by a different detective 
but involving a different defendant and residence fails. 
When officers violate article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution by making 
intentional or reckless false statements to establish probable cause, the proper remedy is 
the exclusion of the evidence. 
A. The intentional or reckless mislabeling of the informant as a "concerned 
citizen" not only misled the magistrate but denied her the ability to properly 
evaluate the relevant factors in determining whether probable cause existed. 
Case law clearly establishes that the type of informant named in an affidavit bears 
on their reliability. See State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, \\4, 40 P.3d 1136 (citation 
omitted) (recognizing that an "ordinary citizen-informant needs no 'independent proof of 
reliability or veracity."'); see also Appellant Opening Brief 20-27. This classification is 
relied on by magistrates in weighing the totality of the circumstances when determining 
whether probable cause is established. See State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, fflfl 1-25, 104 
P.3d 1265 (some of the factors looked at when evaluating the sufficiency of an affidavit 
based on information given by an informant include corroborating details, statements 
against penal interest, participation in criminal activity and personal observation). 
Therefore, by necessity, the magistrate relies on the officer's truthfulness when defining 
the type of informant relied on to establish the facts and circumstances articulated in the 
affidavit. See State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986) ("[TJhe magistrate can 
only fulfill his constitutional function if the information given to him is true."). 
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The record is clear that Detective Teerlink believed that if he had identified Mr. 
Lambson as "just [] an anonymous informant, then it would not be" enough to establish 
probable cause. R. 221:25. The state contends that Detective Teerlink cannot be 
considered to have intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate because descriptions 
characterizing different types of informants are at best "legal terms of art." Appellee 
Brief 27. That despite officers long history of using the terms "concerned citizen" 
"police informant" and "confidential informant" accurately to inform magistrates 
regarding the level of reliability and veracity of informants, the state charges that 
suddenly officers "cannot be expected to understand the[] nuances" of the labels used to 
describe types of informants. Appellee Brief 27. Regardless of the state's general 
contention, the record in this case supports that Detective Teerlink was acutely aware that 
the term he used to classify Mr. Lambson would affect probable cause. R. 221:25. 
Within the affidavit Detective Teerlink referred to Mr. Lambson three times as a 
"concerned citizen." R. 79-81. Detective Teerlink testified that he classified Mr. 
Lambson as a "concerned citizen" because he did not feel that he fit within the guidelines 
normally used for confidential informants. R. 221:25-26. The state asserts that this 
supports that the detective did not intentionally or recklessly mislead the magistrate 
because Mr. Lambson possessed "characteristics found in citizen informants" in that his 
name was disclosed and no promises of leniency were made to him. Appellee Brief 28. 
Yet, Detective Teerlink's testimony, with his "experience in writing search warrants," 
does not indicate that he was unfamiliar with the fact that the type of informant used 
impacts on a finding of probable cause. R. 221:23. Indeed, not only did Detective 
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Teerlink acknowledge that had he classified Mr. Lambson as an "anonymous informant" 
the affidavit would fail to establish probable cause, but testified that he knew that 
"concerned citizen" informants were accorded more reliability than "criminal 
informants." R. 221:26. 
Under the state's theory, any informant, regardless of circumstance, who provides 
his name and has been given no express promise of leniency would qualify for the special 
status of "concerned citizens" where their statements would be presumed reliable. See 
State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (reliability and veracity are not 
questioned where citizen informers are concerned because "citizen informers, unlike 
police informers, volunteer information out of concern for the community and not for 
personal benefit."). Such an outcome not only goes against established case law 
regarding the status of an informant's impact on the probable cause determination but 
denies the magistrate the ability to properly evaluate the relevant factors when 
determining whether probable cause exists. See State v. White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1199 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he veracity or reliability of an informant is still a relevant 
consideration when reviewing the totality of the circumstances." However, the 
"
c[v]eracity is generally assumed when the information comes from an "average citizen 
who is in a position to supply information by virtue of having been a crime victim or 
witness.'"" quoting State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah Ct. App.) cert denied, 765 
P.2d 1277 (1987)). 
Despite the detective's misleading classification of the informant, the state 
contends that "simultaneous" presentation of the affidavit by another detective submitted 
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to secure a search warrant of a different defendant's residence involving a different case, 
adequately apprised the magistrate of the true circumstances surrounding the informant's 
information. See Appellee Brief 15-18. However, even though the detective testified 
that the affidavits were submitted simultaneously, it is a leap of logic to conclude that the 
magistrate actually cross-referenced the affidavits without raising any questions about 
their obvious discrepancies. 
The Hardin affidavit, used to secure a search warrant in a different case for a 
different defendant, described Mr. Lambson as a person "who was detained by Murray 
Police, concerning a stolen ring." R. 83. Several paragraphs later, the Hardin affidavit 
describes Lambson as a "concerned citizen" but also states that the detective "has 
independently verified the information that Mr. Lambson has provided and found it to be 
true to the best of [his] knowledge" and details, among other things, the surveillance done 
on the other defendant's residence. R. 84. In contrast, the Teerlink affidavit, used to 
secure a search warrant in this case, states that he "has received information from a 
concerned citizen named Gary Lambson" who stated there was stolen jewelry at the 
Appellant's address. R. 79. The Teerlink affidavit then states that "Mr. Lambson met 
with [defendant in another case] for the purpose of buying jewelry." 
Daniel v. Keener traveled with Mr. Lambson to 849 North Sir Phillip 
Drive. Mr. Lambson was told that this was Daniel V. Keener's son's 
residence. The son is named Daniel Lee Keener. Inside the residence 
Daniel V. Keener retrieved a bag of jewelry. Mr. Lambson said the bag 
contained rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets. Mr. Lambson purchased 
a ring for $50 from Daniel V. Keener. Mr. Lambson said Daniel V. Keener 
put some of the jewelry in his pocket and left most of the jewelry in the bag 
at the listed residence. . . . 
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. . . Mr. Lambson took the ring he purchased to Mike's Custom Jewelry and 
Repair at 254 East 6400 South for the purpose of selling it. 
R. 79. The affidavit then states that the clerk at the jewelry store recognized the ring as 
belonging to another employee that was stolen along with other jewelry from the 
employee's vehicle. R. 79-80. The affidavit states that "the information received from 
the concerned citizen" is considered "accurate and reliable because: The concerned 
citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided . . . his name, date of birth and criminal history" 
and was informed that if he gave "any false information he would be charged with 
interfering with an investigation." R. 80. Given these vastly different descriptions of the 
informant, it can only be concluded that the magistrate either did not closely read the 
names referenced in the affidavits or that she did not cross-reference them. Otherwise, the 
different status of the informant would have raised questions in the magistrates mind as to 
which affidavit is accurate. If the magistrate knew that the affidavits referenced the 
same informant it is counterintuitive to think that it would not have raised questions about 
whether Mr. Lambson was actually a criminal informant or a concerned citizen. Where 
there were no questions regarding the discrepancies, it weighs against a finding that the 
magistrate referenced each of the affidavits in making her determination of probable 
cause. 
Furthermore, as argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, reliance on information 
outside the four corners of the affidavit to establish probable cause is improper. The state 
argues that the court necessarily had to rely on information outside of the affidavit once 
defendant challenged the detective's intentions in mislabeling the informant. See 
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Appellee Brief 12. However, the state blurs the standards regarding evidence relied on to 
establish probable cause found within the four corners of an affidavit and evidence 
introduced to establish whether a detective acted intentionally or recklessly in including 
or omitting material information. When making a determination of probable cause, the 
magistrate is "'bound by the contents of the affidavit."' Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at ^|9. 
"An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the 
existence of probable cause, and [] wholly conclusory statements] . . . fail[] to meet this 
requirement." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) ("In order to ensure tha t . . . an 
abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to 
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued."). 
On the other hand, when it is alleged that the contents of an affidavit contain 
intentional or reckless material statements or omit information which was necessary to 
the finding of probable cause, a Franks evidentiary hearing assists the trial court in 
determining the truth of such allegation. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
If it is shown that indeed the officer intentionally or reckless included or omitted 
information, that information under federal law is either excised or added to the affidavit. 
Id at 171-72; Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986). After the information has been 
excised or included, the court then examines the four corners of the affidavit again to 
determine whether the information is sufficient to support a determination of probable 
cause. Id. If not, the information is deemed material and the search warrant must be 
suppressed. Id. 
7 
The state argues that even if probable cause must be established within the four 
corners of the affidavit, the detective's characterization of the informant as a "concerned 
citizen" was not misleading when the affidavit is read as a whole. See Appellee Brief 21-
23. However, the whole of the affidavit is misleading regarding the informant and his 
reliability. The first time the magistrate is introduced to the informant in the middle of 
page two within the four page affidavit, he is described as a "concerned citizen" whom 
the detective "has received information from" within the last 6 hours. R. 79. The 
affidavit continues that "Mr. Lambson stated that there is stolen jewelry at [Appellant's 
address]." R. 79. Mr. Lambson "also stated that the individuals who reside or otherwise 
occupy [this residence] are engaging in an ongoing narcotics distribution operation." R. 
79. There is no mention of Mr. Lambsorfs detention status. R. 79. The affidavit then 
gives a brief summary of Mr. Lambson meeting with another individual "for the purpose 
of buying jewelry" and what Mr. Lambson alleges he saw during his purchase follows. 
R. 79. 
The affidavit then describes "Mr. Lambson [taking] the ring he purchased" to a 
jewelry store "for the purpose of selling it." R.79. At the time Mr. Lambson was trying 
to sell the ring he had purchased, the clerk at the jewelry store "recognized the ring as the 
one that belongs to another employee" which has been "stolen out of her vehicle along 
with other jewelry." R. 79-80. The affidavit then states that "[t]he police responded to 
[the jewelry store] and questioned Mr. Lambson." R. 80. Again, there is no mention of 
Mr. Lambson's detention status at the police station. R. 79-80. According to the 
affidavit, Mr. Lambson was shown a list by the detective from which he identifies various 
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pieces of jewelry "he saw in [another defendant's] bag of jewelry at the listed residence." 
R. 80. 
The affidavit then again refers to Mr. Lambson as a "concerned citizen" stating 
that the information received from him is considered "accurate and reliable." R. 80. 
Citing the reasons the information is considered accurate and reliable the detective once 
again refers to Mr. Lambson as a concerned citizen stating "[t]he concerned citizen, Gary 
Lambson, has provided your affiant with his name, date of birth and criminal history. 
Your affiant informed Mr. Lambson that if he gave your affiant any false information he 
would be charged with interfering with an investigation." R. 80. Contrary to the state's 
assertions, nothing contained in this affidavit relays to the magistrate that this informant 
is himself actively being detained and questioned for his possible role in a crime. This 
affidavit does nothing to inform the magistrate that the circumstances in which the 
information was received were highly conducive to a detained informant being motivated 
to give information after he had been caught red-handed with stolen jewelry in an attempt 
to curry favor with police and deflect responsibility or blame. 
The detective referred to the informant three times as a "concerned citizen," failed 
to alert the magistrate to the informant's detention status related to the criminal 
investigation, failed to corroborate the information received, and failed to state the 
informant's criminal history all of which materially affected the affidavit. In light of the 
detective's knowledge that casting the informant as a "concerned citizen" would make 
him appear more reliable, the detective's actions were intentionally or recklessly 
misleading. Not only were the detective's actions misleading, they denied the magistrate 
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the ability to properly evaluate the relevant factors under the totality of the circumstances 
in determining whether probable cause existed. Thus, as argued in Appellant's Opening 
Brief, where the detective's misstatements and omissions were intentionally or recklessly 
false and material and the affidavit otherwise fails to establish probable cause, the 
evidence should be suppressed. See Appellant's Opening Brief. 
B. Suppression of the evidence is a proper remedy under the Utah Constitution 
where a detective intentionally or recklessly makes false statements to the 
court to secure a search warrant 
The issue of whether the exclusionary rule applies for violations of article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution has been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court. In 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion), the supreme court 
"expressly h[eld] that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence 
of police violations of article I, section 14." IdL; see also State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 
415, 419 (Utah 1991) (affirming holding in Larocco). 
This rule properly insures that article I, section 14's prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures will adequately protect our citizen 
against illegal police conduct. Anything less would reduce this provision to 
nothing more than a form of words. 
State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32,1J33 n.12, 996 P.2d 546. 
As noted in Appellant's Opening Brief, the supreme court in Nielsen, stated "that 
the federal law as it has developed since Franks v. Delaware is not entirely adequate." 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 192. And "upholding of [a] warrant under federal law" is not 
determinative "of how the issue [of an immaterial, intentional misstatement in an 
affidavit] might be resolved under the Utah Constitution." Id, at 192-93. In arguing that 
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article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution offers no greater protection than the Fourth 
amendment, the stale attempts to harken back to pre-Tiedemann analysis when 
interpreting the state constitution. See Appellee Brief 41-47. However, when 
interpreting Utah's Constitution, the supreme court has been guided by "the traditional 
methods of constitutional analysis," including '"historical and textual evidence, sister 
state law, and policy arguments,'" and it is resolved by whichever of these "legitimate 
sources" the Court finds helpful in deciding the case at hand. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 
UT 49, [^37, 162 P.3d 1106, (citation omitted); see State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, [^18, 
164 P.3d 397; State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1997); Society of Separationists, 
Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993) (citing cases dating back to 1900 
where this Court has "encouraged parties briefing state constitutional issues to use 
historical and textual evidence, sister state law, and policy arguments" (citations 
omitted)). 
As pointed out in Appellant's Opening Brief, historical evidence, sister state law 
and policy support the argument that the Utah Constitution provides Utah citizens with 
greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Appellant Opening 
Brief 39-47. In addition, policy arguments strongly support quashing a warrant and 
excluding evidence obtained as a result of false or reckless statements made by an officer 
in an affidavit. As the supreme court recognized in Nielsen, "[t]here is no stronger 
argument for developing adequate remedies for violations of the state and federal 
constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures than the example of a 
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police officer deliberately lying under oath in order to obtain a search warrant." Nielsen, 
727 P.2d at 192-93. 
The exclusion of evidence when article I, section 14 has been violated has been 
deemed a proper remedy by the supreme court. Reckless or false statements included or 
omitted in order to obtain a search warrant taint the entire warrant. If a magistrate had 
known that an officer were lying or embellishing the truth in order to establish probable 
cause, it would affect the magistrate's view of the entire affidavit and violate the article I, 
section 14 protection. "Were the judicial response to be merely the elimination of the 
false statements and the assessment of the affidavit's adequacy in the light of the 
remaining averments, enforcement officers would be placed in the untoward position of 
having everything to gain and nothing to lose in strengthening an otherwise marginal 
affidavit by letting their intense dedication to duty blur the distinction between fact and 
fantasy." United States v. Belculfine, 508 F.2d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1974). 
Simply excising false or reckless information whether material or not is an 
inadequate remedy for this type of police misconduct and necessitates broader protections 
from Utah's search and seizure clause. Indeed, intentionally or recklessly misstating such 
a significant fact "exhibits exactly that quality of unscrupled zeal which impelled the 
adoption of the exclusionary rule." Id. at 62. To "properly insure[] that article I, section 
14's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures will adequately protect our 
citizen against illegal police conduct" necessitates interpreting the constitution so as to 
deny the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of false or reckless statements 
made under oath to secure a search warrant. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32,1J33 n.12. In this 
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case, where the protection against unreasonable search and seizure found in article I, 
section 14 was violated, exclusion of the evidence is an appropriate remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
As more fully set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, Mr. Keener respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, and 
reverse his conviction. 
SUBMITTED this 22 day of May, 2008. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
ANDREA J. GARLAND 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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